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Considerable prior analysis has gone into the study of zoning restrictions on locational choice and
on fiscal burdens. The prior work on zoning - particularly fiscal or exclusionary zoning - has provided
both inconclusive theoretical results and quite inconsistent empirical support of the theory. More importantly,
none of this work addresses important questions about the level and distribution of public goods that
are provided under fiscal  zoning. Since fiscal issues and Tiebout demands are central to much of the
motivation for exclusionary zoning, we expand the theoretical analysis to encompass the interplay
between land use restrictions and public good provision. In this, we focus on schooling outcomes,
since the provision of education is one of the primary activities of local jurisdictions. We develop a
general equilibrium model of location and the provision of education. Some households create a fiscal
burden, motivating the use by local governments of exclusionary land-use controls. Then, the paper
analyzes what the market effects of land-use controls are and how successful they are. The policies
considered (minimum lot size zoning, local public finance with a head tax, and fringe zoning) demonstrate












The primary purpose of local political jurisdictions is the provision of public goods tailored
to the needs and desires of their resident populations. In his classic paper on the eciency
of local jurisdictions, Tiebout (1956) shows how choice among local areas allows households
to sort themselves on the basis of demand for the public good that is provided. But this
simple solution breaks down when various realities such as limited numbers of jurisdictions
and nance through local property taxes are acknowledged. One important extension of
the modeling of residential choice and the provision of various packages of taxes and public
goods in the face of these realities has been the introduction of another empirical reality {
the existence of various zoning regulations. Zoning constrains the choices of households and
alters the equilibrium outcomes, potentially improving the Tiebout equilibrium. By focus-
ing entirely on the locus of taxes and expenditures across jurisdictions, this literature has,
however, neglected other important aspects of the residential choices of households. Con-
sideration of these leads to fundamental changes in the equilibrium solutions by households.
This paper introduces accessibility as a second basic facet of residential location and then
highlights how endogenous zoning aects the equilibrium demands for schools, the primary
public good oered by local jurisdictions.
In the world of head taxes and large numbers of jurisdictions, Tiebout sorting leads
to an ecient revelation of public good demands and thus supports the optimal provision
of the public good. Yet, as has long been recognized, the nancing of local jurisdictions
through the property tax changes this solution. Some taxpayers, by buying less expensive
houses within a jurisdiction, can enjoy public expenditures that exceed their contribution
to revenues, creating a scal burden on wealthier households who must make up for this
revenue shortfall. If, however, various zoning devices can be employed, it may be possible
to exclude the households that create the scal burdens.
Considerable prior analysis has gone into the study of various zoning restrictions on
1locational choice and on scal burdens. In an inuential early paper, Hamilton (1975) in-
corporates endogenous zoning in a model where property taxes nance a local public good,
and he shows that zoning allows individuals to perfectly separate themselves by income.
Durlauf (1992) considers a dynamic community model in which communities impose a min-
imum income restriction as a requirement for residence in a community. Henderson (1980)
and Epple, Romer, and Filimon (1988) analyze the endogenous choice of zoning regula-
tions in multicommunity models, but they have no public goods. Fernandez and Rogerson
(1997) study the eect of zoning regulations on allocations and welfare in a two community
model. Recent theoretical work by Calabrese, Epple, and Romano (2007) and Magliocca et
al. (2012) provide new theoretical structures and interesting insights. Nonetheless, the prior
work on zoning - particularly scal or exclusionary zoning - has provided both inconclusive
theoretical results and quite inconsistent empirical support of the theory (Evans (1999)).
The review of the evidence by Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) provides not only a summary
of the issues but ideas on how to resolve the conicting evidence.
Three important things have been missing from this past discussion. First, it is generally
assumed that residential choices are solely a function of the scal characteristics of a location.
This yields perfect sorting across communities in terms of income and very sharp, and
implausible, reactions to changes in the price of local public goods. This conclusions about
homogeneous communities, however, conicts with observations about the nature of U.S.
communities. Across the school districts (communities) in the U.S., communities are quite
heterogenous in terms of income (much more so than in terms of race).1 Moreover, the
heterogeneity of households should not be taken as evidence that Tiebout sorting is not
going on.
Second, while past work has been motivated by the provision of public goods, little is
actually said about the outcomes. The demand by households for schooling outcomes drives
1See Pack and Pack (1977,1978), Persky (1990), Hanushek and Yilmaz (2011).
2not only a portion of local residential choice but also determines the spending for schools
and the variation across districts. Both spending variations and the resultant achievement
dierences have themselves been objects of direct public policy interventions.2
Third, a limited number of jurisdictions necessarily implies that some households will not
have their ideal provision of public goods met. Additionally, restrictions on households such
as the exclusionary zoning considered here will not in general move the locational equilibrium
to the full Tiebout optimum.
This paper addresses each of these issues. It imbeds endogenous zoning within a multi-
faceted model of locational choice that allows for nonscal elements of location. Additionally,
it focuses on the most important local public good - schools - and considers how zoning aects
the level and distribution of educational outcomes.
In order to understand the interactions among these dierent inuences on choices by
households, we develop a general equilibrium model of household location and education
spending decisions. This model permits new insights into the implications of scally-
motivated land use controls. While exclusive communities can improve their educational
quality through land use controls on entry, they do so at the cost of increase the overall
variation in educational quality.
This paper addresses two basic questions about the exclusionary land use controls. First,
to answer why cities use exclusionary land use controls, we develop a general equilibrium
model of location and educational choice in which some households impose a scal bur-
den on the local government. Our work is based on Hanushek and Yilmaz (2007, 2011),
which provides a unied treatment of classical urban location models and Tiebout models of
community choice, and nds equilibrium outcomes that are more consistent with empirical
observations on community heterogeneity. Second, the paper considers the market eects
of exclusionary land use controls and their distributional implications for both educational
2Hanushek and Lindseth (2010)
3outcomes and welfare. The policies considered in the paper are zoning, local public nance
with a head tax, and fringe zoning that limits city expansion.
We present a baseline model of a monocentric city that contains two school districts whose
households dier in income and tastes that reect the value of accessibility, lot size, and public
amenities (education) of a location. An absentee landlord holds an auction at each location
in which households bid for that location. Each jurisdiction provides education, which is
nanced through property taxes on residential land. Property taxes are determined by
majority voting. Households can move without a cost between jurisdictions. In equilibrium,
communities are heterogenous, and some households impose a scal burden on the local
government.
With this structure, we conduct policy experiments with dierent types of exclusionary
land use, and then assess the outcomes in terms of the level and distribution of education.
Having a more realistic model of urban structure proves to be especially important in this
analysis. Public services are tied to specic locations and communities, but locations also
dier in their accessibility and in their housing prices. Ignoring these aspects of location
introduces a distortion in the analysis of policy alternatives, leading to very dierent con-
clusions.
This paper is organized as follows. We rst develop the theoretical framework within
a basic two-jurisdiction, monocentric city model. Because this model is not amenable to
analytical solutions, we then calibrate this model to a protypical city and present benchmark
results. Finally, we introduce local governmental involvement through land use controls and
describe the impacts of the alternative policies on households in each of the jurisdictions.
2 A Model of Accessibility and Local Public Goods
Consider a monocentric city on a featureless xy plane, with a Central Business district
(CBD) at the origin. The rms at the CBD employ skilled and unskilled labor to produce
4a composite commodity. The rms are small so that wages in the CBD are exogenous.
Moreover, the city is divided into two jurisdictions (the East School district and the West
School District), and each jurisdiction operates its own schools. The y-axis, passing through
the CBD, forms the boundary between the two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction nances its
schools through property taxes on residential property. Education is the only service that
the local government provides in each jurisdiction.
The more common depiction of a monocentric city that has a circular central city sur-
rounded by a donut shaped suburban ring is problematic for our analysis.3 For our purposes,
however, this circular structure is problematic, because all locations at any given distance
from the employment center are served by a common school district, making it dicult to
see the separate inuences of location and school quality. Additionally, there are empirical
reasons to consider alternative depictions. The circular city is more of an analytical de-
scription than a realistic portrayal of American cities. The variety of cities that result from
natural boundaries such as lakes, rivers, and mountains or from historical development pat-
terns makes the stylized "von Thunen pattern" more a simplifying device than an accurate
generalization of city structures (see Rose 1989). While it is possible to correct estimation
of density gradients for missing quadrants (see Mills(1972) or Rose(1989)), the simple de-
piction fails in a signicant number of metropolitan areas.4 Our simple city structure here
is seen, for example, in Minneapolis and St. Paul, where a river divides two jurisdictions
(and two school districts). This structure is not meant as a portrayal of any specic area,
however, but instead is employed as the simplest way to illustrate how accessibility and
3With a circular city structure, the radial symmetry permits straightforward analytical solutions of loca-
tion where it is necessary only to trace locational choices along any ray from the employment center. It has
also motivated a large number of empirical analysis of urban form that are based on estimating household
density functions and price gradients emanating from the center (see, for example, Mills(1972, Rose(1989),
and Kim(2007)). See also de Bartolome and Ross (2003) or Cassidy, Epple, and Romer (1989). Note that
our cities have some similar structure in that there is "ring-separation" of dierent household types within
each jurisdiction.
4Kim(2007) describes a number of situations where the standard depiction does not work including, im-
portantly, the signicant numbers of U.S. metropolitan areas with multiple central cities or other anomalies.
Bertaud and Malpezzi (2003) also nd a number of international cities are inaccurately described by smooth
density gradients.
5public goods interact in determining the locational equilibrium. The characterization of a
two-city metropolitan area also permits highlighting the implications of a limited range of
jurisdictional alternatives.
One member of each household works and makes all the economic decisions in the house.
Based on their earnings, households are categorized as skilled and unskilled worker house-
holds. Skilled workers make ws dollars per hour while unskilled workers make wu dollars
per hour. Also, households place dierent values on the quality of education a jurisdiction
provides. Some value education more (high valuation types), some less (low valuation types).
Thus, we have four dierent types of households in the city i 2 fSL; SH; UL; UHg { namely
Skilled Low Valuation Households (SL), Skilled High Valuation Households (SH), Unskilled
Low Valuation Households (UL), and Unskilled High Valuation Households (UH). As will
be clear, with just two dierent preference levels for education, a household that has a low
valuation of education necessarily has a high valuation of accessibility.
Consider a type i 2 fSL; SH; UL; UHg household seeking a residence at a location,
that is r miles from the CBD in jurisdiction j. The time endowment for the household is
24 hours. The city has a dense radial transportation system. Households commute between
workplaces and residences. Commuting has both pecuniary and time costs.5 Formally,
commuting requires a=2 dollars and b=2 hours per mile. Income is derived solely from labor.
Thus, the household's income, net of transportation costs, is Yi(r) = 24wi   (a + bwi)r.
The preferences for households are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function given by
U(i;i;q;s;z;l) = q
i
j sizl, where i + i +  +  = 1, qj is the quality of education in
community j2 fw;eg, s > 0 is the lot size which proxies residential quality6, z > 0 is the
numeraire composite commodity, l 2 [0;24] is leisure, i 2 fH; Lg is the taste parameter
for education and, i 2 fH; Lg is the taste parameter for lot size. The budget constraint
5Pecuniary costs of commuting are not negligible in U.S. See Altman and Desalvo (1981) for an early
estimate. Internet sites oer commuting cost calculators that put the 2011 cost per mile at over $1 (see, for
example, http://commutesolutions.org/external/calc.html [accessed December 26, 2011].
6It is implicitly assumed that each household manages the construction of his house by himself and that
the lot size indexes the overall quality of the residential services.
6of the household is given by
z(r) + (1 + j)R(r)s(r) + wil(r) = Yi(r) = 24wi   (a + bwi)r
where j is the property tax rate, Rj(r) is the equilibrium rent per unit of land paid to a
landlord for his land in community j. Notice that this formulation suggests that households
sell all available time to employers and buy back some leisure at the prevailing market wage
rate.
We can dene the bid-rent function of the household, which shows the household's ability
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(i++)(i++) is a constant. It is easy to observe that bid-rent is convex and
decreasing in distance, while bid-max lot size function is convex and increasing in distance.
The land use pattern that will arise in equilibrium is determined by the relative steepness
of bid-rent functions of the four dierent household types. In general, a steeper equilibrium
bid rent curve corresponds to an equilibrium location closer to the CBD.
As in Alonso (1964), we assume a competitive land market in which households bid for
land and land owners oer the land to the highest bidder. For any given location, the
landlord receives ve implicit oers. She may rent her land to any of our four dierent types
of households or leave the land for a non-urban purpose (e.g. agriculture). When the latter
occurs, she gets a xed bid of ra.
Our city is closed and home ownership relies on an absentee owner who rents houses to
all households. In other words, the population of each of our four types of households are
7exogenously given. There are  NSL identical Skilled Low Valuation Households,  NSH identi-
cal Skilled High Valuation Households,  NUL identical Unskilled Low Valuation Households,
and  NUH identical Unskilled High Valuation Households.
Let L(r) be the land density at distance r. By denition, the amount of land available for
housing between the distance r and r+dr is L(r)dr. Since we have radial symmetry around
the CBD, L(r) is simply L(r) = r in either jurisdiction. Also, let nj(r) be the equilibrium
density function of the household distribution in jurisdiction j 2 fw;eg. That is, the number
of households between the distance r and r + dr equals nj(r)dr in jurisdiction j. Without
loss of generality, let the equilibrium residence of a location at distance r in jurisdiction j be
a type i household. Then, the marginal household population at distance r in community j
is given as nj(r) =
L(r)
s(r;u
i;:). Also, since  Ni i 2 fSL; SH; UL; UHg; type i households reside










e(r) = i] dr =  Ni
Where t
j(r) j 2 fw;eg, is a function showing the occupant of the location at distance
r in jurisdiction j, in equilibrium. The indicator function, I[t
j(r) = i] j 2 fw;eg, takes
the value 1 if the equilibrium resident of location at distance r in jurisdiction j is a type i
household, 0 otherwise. The population constraint implicitly assumes that the land market
clears in jurisdiction j 2 fw;eg. Formally,
Sj(r)nj(r) = L(r) 8r  r
fj
From a household's point of view, each jurisdiction is characterized by the quality of
education and property tax rate pair (qj;j) it provides. Now, we turn to the question of
determining (qj;j) in community j 2 fw;eg. Then, the government budget constraint in
community j is





8where Nj is the population, ej is the expenditure per pupil, and  Rj is the tax base per
pupil in community j. Characterizing the quality of education has proved dicult. Here, to
maintain comparability with the prior literature, we emphasize only educational spending,
which can be interpreted as either actual quality of the schools or simply perceived quality.7
The perceived quality of education in community j is given by a production function
qj = c1 e
c2
j
where c1; c2 > 0 and c2 < 1 are constants: Notice that the production function is concave,
implying diminishing marginal returns to expenditure per pupil. The property taxes are
determined by majority voting in each jurisdiction. Then, a myopic type i household at
distance r in community j's preferred tax rate is given by the following problem:






j Yi(r)i++ subject to qj = j(:)ej
ej = j  Rj
Solving this problem yields the preferred tax rate for type i household, ~ i =
i
i i. Note
that the preferred tax rate is independent of income and is a function of the household's
valuation type. Since there are only two valuation types for households, there are two
possible preferred tax rates in the economy, and high valuation types have a higher preferred
tax rate (~ SH > ~ SL and ~ UH > ~ UL).
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of each period, Households make
community/residential choice decisions with the expectation that the last period's education
and property tax packages would prevail in the current period. Once they move in, they are
stuck. They vote for the property tax rate in their community of residence. The public good
7Prior literature has shown that it is dicult to characterize school quality when the outcome is mea-
sured by student performance (See Hanushek (1996, 2003) for empirical evidence on achievement production
functions). At the same time, households clearly use spending as a proxy for school quality and factor
that into their locational decisions. Thus, we take a positivist view of school quality as it aects consumer
behavior. In prior work, we have also considered the role of peer groups in the production function for
schools (Hanushek and Yilmaz 2007, 2011). However, that formulation unduly complicates the analysis
here without yielding an additional insights. Under most formulations, it will reinforce the basic scal
forces involved, and we wish to show the operation of these forces in the simplest scal model.
9and tax rate package might be dierent from what they expected. Since they are immobile,
they do not have much choice but to consume what the community oers for this period.
At the beginning of the next period, they update their expectations, and events start over
again.
Denition: An equilibrium is a set of utility levels u
i 8 i 2 fSL; SH; UL; UHg, market
rent curves Rj(r) j 2 fw;eg, quality of education and property tax pairs (qj;j) j 2 fw;eg,
household population distribution functions nj(r) j 2 fw;eg, and types functions t
j(r)
j 2 fw;eg which show the equilibrium occupant of the location at distance r in community
j such that
 Dierent household types bid for each location. The land at a location is developed
for the highest bidder if the highest bid exceeds the xed non-urban purpose bid of ra.
Otherwise, it is not developed.
 All job opportunities are oered by a rm located at the CBD. Wages in the CBD are
exogenously determined. The city has a dense radial commuting system. Households
commute to workplaces. Commuting has both pecuniary and time costs.
 Regardless of their location or communities, households of the same type attain the
same utility level. (I.e., in equilibrium a type i household gets u
i everywhere)
 The city contains two jurisdictions, each of which operates its own schools. Moreover,
it is a closed city (i.e. populations for each types are exogenous) and the land is owned
by absentee landlords.
 The local public good, education, is produced through a production function, and
is nanced through local property taxes on residential land, determined by majority
voting in each jurisdiction.
 Labor and land markets clear.
10Parameter Value Parameter Value
H 0.016 H 0.034
L 0.013 L 0.037
 0.2  0.75
a $1 b 0.13 hrs
ws $19 wu $10
c1 3.66 c2 0.84
Table 1: Calibration Parameters
 The local government budget balances in all jurisdictions.
3 Calibration of the Urban Economy
The model is calibrated to match some key stylized facts of a typical skilled high valuation
(SH) household and a typical middle size city in the U.S. in which she lives.
The hourly wages for unskilled and skilled workers are calibrated as wu  10 and ws  18,
respectively. These number are obtained from the fact that in the U.S., average weekly hours
of persons working full time is about 40 hours8, and the average annual earnings of 18 year or
over high school and college graduate workers are $22;154 and $38;112, respectively in 1997.
Assuming the household works for 40 hours a week, the share of leisure in the household's
budget is 
H++ = 1   40ws
247ws  0:76: The data on average annual expenditures of some
selected MSAs suggest that a household spends about one-fth of its income on shelter.
Therefore, the budget share of composite commodity and land are set to be

H++ =
(1   0:76)  0:8  0:19 and
H
H++ = (1   0:76)  0:2  0:048, respectively. Moreover,
recall that the preferred tax rate for a type i household is given by ~ i =
i
i i and we had
two possible preferred tax rates, one for high valuation and another for low valuation type
households. The one for high (low) valuation type is set to be about 2.2 percent (1.3 percent).
These values are sucient to permit calibration of H; L; H; L; ; :
The pecuniary commuting cost per round trip mile is based on the cost of owning and
operating an automobile. In 1997, pecuniary cost per mile was 53.08 cents, suggesting a
8The statistical facts, unless otherwise indicated, come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1998.
11pecuniary commuting cost of a = $1 per round trip mile. Assuming the commuting speed is
15 miles per hour within the city, the time cost of commuting per round trip mile is set to
be b = 0:13 hours.
In equilibrium, the endogenous urban fringe distance is set at about 10 miles in both
jurisdictions. The population of the city is set to be 1,500,000 households, which implies
approximately a population density of 8,000 households per square mile9. Approximately,
40 percent of the total population is assumed to be skilled worker households. Moreover,
25 percent of skilled households are assumed to be low valuation type. As for the unskilled
households, 75 percent are low valuation types.
The agricultural rent bid ra is set to be $6;850 per acre per year. The parameters of the
education production function are set to be c1 = 3:66; c2 = 0:84 so that (qj;j) preferences of
households in jurisdiction j 2 fw;eg are consistent with (qj;j) pairs that induce the desired
population distribution.
4 Benchmark Results
In equilibrium, households of each type form a concentric ring, or zone, within each of the
two jurisdictions around the employment center, and zones for all household types are ranked
by the distance from the city center in the order of steepness of their bid-rent functions. The
results for the benchmark equilibrium are shown in Table 2 and Figures 1 through 3. Our
results are quite consistent with the residential pattern observed in the United States. In
both cities, households with higher incomes typically locate farther from the CBD, occupying
larger dwellings than households with lower incomes. Moreover, for each income group, those
with high valuation of education live further from the center than those with low valuation
of education (i.e., those with high valuation of accessibility).
These patterns are shown for the East city in gures 1 and 2. (Note that the labeling of
9The median population per square mile of cities with 200,000 or more population was 3,546 in 1992.
Source: County and City Data Book, 1994.
12Types West East
School Quality 11.5 15
Tax Rate 1.35% 2.22%
Skilled Low 8.2 1.8
Skilled High 9.3 20.7
Unskilled Low 29 16.1
Unskilled High 2.3 12.6
Table 2: Benchmark Distribution of Population and School Quality
the two cities is arbitrary). The price of land varies across locations with distance due to
commuting costs, as in a standard urban location model. The West city follows the same
general pattern (not shown), although the rents at any given distance from the employment
center will be lower because of the lower school quality (discussed below). Across com-
munities the quality of education and property taxes dier, and in equilibrium households
are indierent to living in either jurisdiction. This dierences in rents across jurisdictions is
nothing but the capitalization of accessibility and diering quality of education.
The communities are heterogenous in both income and tastes, and all types are present in
both communities (Table 2).10 (The table gives the distribution of households by jurisdiction
as a percent of the total population in both jurisdictions). This heterogeneity of communities
is the result of the two components of a location: access to employment and school quality.
All households of a given type in terms of income and tastes for education are happy with
their residential location in equilibrium, but some of each type will end up purchasing more
access and less schooling in trading o the two at equilibrium prices. This aspect of the
model introduces a realism that is important in judging policy alternatives that dierentially
aect the two communities.
In our baseline model, Table 2 shows that the East School district provides the best
education and is the community of choice for most of the high valuation households, whether
of high or low income (skill) level. This better education does come with a higher price tag,
10Note that there is a trivially dierent equilibrium where East and West are simply switched. In each
case, however, our prior work shows that the solution converges on the same equilibrium, independent of the
starting point chosen, when there are no peer eects in the educational production function. See Hanushek
and Yilmaz (2007).
13namely higher property taxes than the West School District, but this is the majority vote
equilibrium of the households.
Following Hamilton (1975), we have concentrated on property taxes to fund our local
education, as consistent with U.S. school nance. Figure 3, the derived tax bill for dierent
households in the East community, vividly shows the issue of scal burden. The use of a
property tax implies a low tax liability for households in small houses (small lots), but a
high tax liability for households in big houses. As shown in Figure 3, the annual spending of
about $1,951 in the East School district is met with an annual tax liability of a small house
of about $1,500 but a corresponding liability of $2,700 for each household in a big house.
The households with the larger houses are eectively subsidizing the education of those with
smaller houses. This observation identies powerful incentives for communities to regulate
the development of new land.
The scal disparities by households imply that there are larger incentives in the East
district to exclude low income households with their lower consumption of quality housing.
In the West, where school quality is less, the scal disparity is also reduced so that poor
households pay about $1,120 in taxes to pay for the school expenditure of $1,423. A majority
of the residents are low income households. Further, they attract a disproportionate share
of high skilled households who have a low valuation of schooling. The predominance of
low income and low valuation household in the West implies that they do not want to raise
school spending in the West district. As a result, the majority in West would not want to
exclude low income voters.
For the rest of the paper, we will study the impact of some alternative land use policies
on the ecient provision of education and how successful they are in terms of excluding
households that would impose a scal burden on the government. In all cases, we consider
the case where the East imposes controls, while the West does not.
145 Land-use Controls
We use this expanded locational choice model to analyze how a local government can exclude
households by some land use controls. We consider alternative kinds of restrictions (which
may or may not be permissible for use by any given jurisdiction, depending on state laws):
zoning, lump sum tax, and fringe distance zoning. Each land use control is designed by the
East in an attempt to exclude those imposing a scal burden on the high income residents.
The key question is eectiveness of each kind of control and the implications for household
location and school quality.
5.1 Minimum Lot Size Zoning:
To deal with the scal disparities, the local government in the East has an incentive to
exclude households that impose a scal burden by introducing zoning regulations that set a
minimum lot size (MLS) per household in residential land use, sm. With this device, it hopes
to eliminate the smallest houses, i.e., the ones imposing the largest burdens on the other
residents. To determine the minimum lot size, the local government requires poor households
in small houses to at least consume sm =4090 square feet so that their contribution to the
provision of public good would at least be about the expenditure per pupil in the East School
District at the benchmark.
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o
subject to s  sm
Observing that the utility function is concave, the bid-rent and bid-max lot size function






















(1+j)sm if r < rm
15Types West East
School Quality 10.3 18.3
Tax Rate 1.35% 2.22%
Skilled Low 10 0
Skilled High 0 30
Unskilled Low 31.5 13.4
Unskilled High 15.1 0
Table 3: Equilibrium Distribution of Population and School Quality under Minimum Lot




s(:) if r  rm
sm if r < rm
where rm is the eective distance that is determined by the intersection between the lot
size, s(.) curve and the horizontal sm line. (Consumers in the West solve the same problem
except that sm = 0). Since the lot size curve is increasing in distance, the household would
be constrained at r < rm, and the bid-rent function for closer in properties becomes the
bid-rent for the minimum lot size. As expected and seen in Figure 4, the bid-rent curve in
the East is a straight line when households are constrained. The reason for this result is
that the price of land increases as the distance to the city center decreases, and households
respond to lower land prices by consuming less land. Once they reach the minimum lot size
requirement, they cannot alter their land consumption, and it is linear. When they can alter
their consumption, the bid-rent curve is convex.
In equilibrium, the East district continues to provide a better education, but there are
signicant locational changes compared to the benchmark case. A summary of the new
equilibrium outcome is found in Table 3 and gures 4 through 6. All Skilled Low Valuation
(SL) and Unskilled High Valuation (UH) households ee from the East School District, which
no longer best serves their needs. In addition, only a relatively small portion of Unskilled
Low Valuation households stay in the East. All of the Skilled High Valuation households
now reside in the East, which has become an exclusive city with fewer residents and higher
16average income. Many of the Unskilled Low Valuation households previously in the East
stay in the East, but they are now forced to consume an amount of land, sm that is greater
than the bid-max lot size without such a regulation. Thus, some scal burden of low income
households remains in the East, but it is considerably reduced by the exclusionary zoning.
To explain the increasing amounts of annual tax liability of Skilled High Valuation House-
holds at locations closer to the CBD in Figure 6, recall that they consume the minimum lot
size and their tax liability increases towards the CBD due to increasing land prices. This
result is dierent from Hamilton (1975). In a given community, both land consumption and
tax liability dier across household types, while Hamilton nds that every household in a
given community consumes the same amount of housing in equilibrium and pays the same
amount of property taxes.
By extension, it is clearly possible to form a pure Skilled High Households community in
the east by suciently raising the Minimum Lot Size (MLS) requirement level. This would
make it unattractive for the Unskilled Low Valuation households, who would then prefer the
West.
5.2 Head Taxes
The commonly-analyzed simple Tiebout model nances the local public goods with a con-
stant tax for all individuals in a jurisdiction. Given the homogeneous nature of each district
in the standard Tiebout model, the constant, or head, tax does not have much impact. In
our model, however, the heterogeneity of districts in terms of income and equilibrium land
consumption implies that the property tax and head tax will operate quite dierently.
As should be clear, a head tax would eliminate the scal burden.11 We consider the
possibility of applying a at tax in the East School District, which is concerned with the
11While head taxes are not common in the U.S., they are used partially to nance schools in California.
The introduction of a property tax limitation (Proposition 13) eectively set the property tax rate at a
constant across the state. Individual districts may, with voter approval, establish a parcel tax that is the
same for all residences in the jurisdiction regardless of their value.
17Types West East
School Quality 9.82 15
Property Tax Rate 1.35% 0%
Skilled Low 5.9 4.1
Skilled High 1.1 28.9
Unskilled Low 44.9 0
Unskilled High 15.1 0
Table 4: Equilibrium Distribution of Population and School Quality under Head taxes in
the East
presence of the households that impose scal burdens on the local government, instead of
the property tax. We analyze the implications of setting the head tax in the East at the
expenditure per pupil in the benchmark.
As a result of the new policy, no unskilled workers wish to reside in the East (see Table
4 ). A few additional skilled low valuation households move the East, compared to the
baseline, because of the increased accessibility from the East. But, with the fall in average
property values in the West, the quality of schools declines in the West, again compared to
the baseline. In total, fewer people now nd the East to be an attractive residential location
compared to the baseline, and its population is less.
5.3 Reduced Fringe Distance
An alternative land use policy frequently pursued is simply to deny new development within
a city, thus making it more exclusive. For our modeling, we consider (urban) fringe zoning
in which residential land use is restricted within a certain radius, rf from the city center.12
Here, rf is chosen to be eight miles. In order to reduce the scal burden of the baseline
this policy would have to drive out unskilled households, because the land that is available
for residential allocation in the East is smaller, allocated to the highest bidder, and skilled
households can aord to bid more. In the new equilibrium, however, it is not so clear.
12Note that we think of this as maintaining restrictions on any expansions in the city, as is typical of
many European cities. A policy to actually move the fringe in clearly reduces the value of property that
was formerly residential and the owners would have to be compensated for such actions. Also, if the fringe
moves out, so that the population expands, the new equilibrium can imply a reduced school quality for the
East district.
18Types West East
School Quality 11.8 14.7
Tax Rate 1.35% 2.22%
Skilled Low 10 0
Skilled High 0 30
Unskilled Low 31.5 13.4
Unskilled High 15.1 0
Table 5: Equilibrium Distribution of Population and School Quality after Reduced Fringe
Distance Zoning in the East
As shown in Table 5, the quality of education falls in the East compared to the baseline.
All Skilled Low Valuation households move to the West School District, less high valuation
households reside in the East, and more Unskilled Low valuation households live in the
East school district. This policy is not eective at excluding households that impose a
scal burden on the local government. Once again, skilled households subsidize unskilled
households, and the problem of scal burden in the East remains.
To understand the failure of fringe zoning, recall that the spatial allocation of households
is determined by the relative steepness of bid-rent curves. In the model, poor households
have a steeper bid-rent curve, and they reside in locations closer to the CBD, leading to the
failure of this policy to exclude the "right" households.
5.4 Implications for School Quality
The land use control policies all were motivated by reducing the scal transfers within a
subset of the jurisdictions. A particularly interesting aspect of these policies is that they
also have implications for the level and distribution of schooling. Specically, by ending up
with a dierent distribution of households, some of whom are constrained by the land use
policies, the political support for schools changes in the two districts. Within each district,
the combination of majority voting on tax rates and the heterogeneity of households within
the districts means that a number of households typically are trading o school quality for
accessibility and housing prices { and the educational outcomes will depend on the mix of
households in the dierent communities.
19Policy West East Mean Std
Benchmark 11.5 15 13.3 2.5
MLS Zoning 10.3 18.3 14.3 5.6
Head Tax 9.8 15 12.4 3.7
Reduced Fringe 11.8 14.7 13.3 2.9
Table 6: The quality of education across districts under various land use control regimes
We rst look at the results for school quality by school district, as summarized in Table
6 and Figure 7. In general, the jurisdiction imposing land use controls can maintain as high
or higher school quality for those households remaining in the district. However, the quality
in the other jurisdiction (West) tends to decline. The resulting average quality of schools
may or may not decline, but uniformly the variance in quality consistently increases.
With minimum lot size zoning, the gains in school quality in the East district are sucient
to oset the declines in the West so that average school quality increases. With the other
policies, however, the average quality declines, implying that these land use controls work
against public policy objectives of increasing quality and reducing variance.
Simply looking at the results by city, however, is incomplete, because the equilibrium
outcomes of the dierent policies imply considerable movement across cities. An alternative
summary is to investigate the school quality outcomes for the dierent families in our anal-
ysis, denominated by either income or valuation of schooling. Table 7 summarizes how the
dierent types make out after the East district imposes the alternative land use controls.
The skilled households and the households that highly value schooling do better in terms
of school quality with MLS zoning (compared to the benchmark case), and the skilled workers
also improve school quality with the head tax. The reduced fringe zoning (growth limita-
tions) lower school quality for both groups. The unskilled and the low valuation residents,
who are generally simply reacting to the policies of the East, nd that their school quality
generally decreases { although any change is minimal with the reduced fringe zoning.
20Average School Quality
Benchmark MLS Zoning Head Tax Reduced Fringe
Skilled Residents 13.5 16.3 14.1 13.1
Unskilled Residents 13.2 12.1 9.8 13.2
High Valuation Families 14.1 15.6 13.1 13.7
Low Valuation Families 12.6 12.3 10.2 12.7
Table 7: The quality of education across household types under various land use control
regimes.
6 Conclusions
The provision of educational services in the United States is tied to residential location.
A range of active governmental policies have been aimed at altering both the level and the
distribution of education across school districts, and it is clear that these policy deliberations
must consider household reactions to policies and the alternative reasons why household
choose a given location.13 This analysis focuses on the actions of individual jurisdictions to
restrict the options available to households through exclusionary zoning and thus to improve
their local scal situation. We embed our endogenous zoning choices within a simple model
that recognizes that a given location oers both accessibility to employment and local schools.
The quality of schools depends, however, on the preferences of local voters, something that
could change in the aggregate with dierent policies. Putting these basic elements together,
we can provide a general equilibrium solution to the household location problem that is
useful for policy simulations.
We consider schools that are funded by property taxes. But, with heterogeneous commu-
nities, the presence of households purchasing dierent quality of homes can impose a scal
burden on the local government, because a household in a small house pays a relatively small
amount in taxes compared to school spending. Concerned with the scal burden of some
households, the local governments may try to exclude those households paying less taxes
than their cost of schooling by means of some exclusionary land use controls: minimum lot
13See, for example, the early study of Feldstein (1975) on state school nance options. More recent analysis
incorporates accessibility into the analysis of governmental policy (Hanushek and Yilmaz (forthcoming)).
21size zoning, lump sum tax, or fringe distance(growth limitation) zoning.
We presume that the district with the highest income, the best school quality, and the
largest scal discrepancies imposes a given land use control, while the other district does not.
The resulting population distributions under the alternative policies dier substantially from
the open market benchmark case. In terms of the quality of education provided, minimum
lot size zoning within our parametrization actually increases average quality of education.
However, as the mean quality of education increases, so does inequality, measured by the
standard deviation. The other cases of permitting head taxes or of reduced fringe zoning
(growth controls) tend to lower average school quality while also increasing the variance in
quality across districts. It is generally true, however, that the upper income residents, who
drive the restrictive zoning, can come out ahead in terms of school quality.
Our theoretical characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is of course dependent upon
the specic utility functions and calibration of the model. Alternative calibrations can
obviously lead to dierent results. The important message from our calibrations is, however,
that the simplest models of locational choice { ones dependent on just the provision of
diering amounts of the local public good { are likely to misstate the locational outcomes
and the nature of public good provision. Specically, models that lead to perfect sorting of
households across communities,  a la Tiebout (1956), are likely to misrepresent the outcomes
that will result from local policy changes. Moreover, the general equilibrium nature of
housing decisions means that the actions of households in one jurisdiction spill over into
other jurisdictions, leading to changes not only in the structure of housing prices but also in
the overall provision of public goods. These can be very signicant when there are limited
numbers of jurisdictions as in our modeling here.
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School ExpenditureFig 4: Monthly Gross Rent per acre with MLS Zoning






















































Fig 6: School Expenditure and Taxes Paid with MLS Zoning (East 































School ExpenditureFig 7: Quality of Education
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